Sound-Induced Flash Illusion is Resistant to Feedback Training

A single flash accompanied by two auditory beeps tends to be perceived as two flashes (Shams et al. Nature 408:788, 2000, Cogn Brain Res 14:147–152, 2002). This phenomenon is known as ‘sound-induced flash illusion.’ Previous neuroimaging studies have shown that this illusion is correlated with modulation of activity in early visual cortical areas (Arden et al. Vision Res 43(23):2469–2478, 2003; Bhattacharya et al. NeuroReport 13:1727–1730, 2002; Shams et al. NeuroReport 12(17):3849–3852, 2001, Neurosci Lett 378(2):76–81, 2005; Watkins et al. Neuroimage 31:1247–1256, 2006, Neuroimage 37:572–578, 2007; Mishra et al. J Neurosci 27(15):4120–4131, 2007). We examined how robust the illusion is by testing whether the frequency of the illusion can be reduced by providing feedback. We found that the sound-induced flash illusion was resistant to feedback training, except when the amount of monetary reward was made dependent on accuracy in performance. However, even in the latter case the participants reported that they still perceived illusory two flashes even though they correctly reported single flash. Moreover, the feedback training effect seemed to disappear once the participants were no longer provided with feedback suggesting a short-lived refinement of discrimination between illusory and physical double flashes rather than vanishing of the illusory percept. These findings indicate that the effect of sound on the perceptual representation of visual stimuli is strong and robust to feedback training, and provide further evidence against decision factors accounting for the sound-induced flash illusion

Multisensory causal inference in the brain

At any given moment, our brain processes multiple inputs from its different sensory modalities (vision, hearing, touch, etc.). In deciphering this array of sensory information, the brain has to solve two problems: (1) which of the inputs originate from the same object and should be integrated and (2) for the sensations originating from the same object, how best to integrate them. Recent behavioural studies suggest that the human brain solves these problems using optimal probabilistic inference, known as Bayesian causal inference. However, how and where the underlying computations are carried out in the brain have remained unknown. By combining neuroimaging-based decoding techniques and computational modelling of behavioural data, a new study now sheds light on how multisensory causal inference maps onto specific brain areas. The results suggest that the complexity of neural computations increases along the visual hierarchy and link specific components of the causal inference process with specific visual and parietal regions

A Simple Artificial Life Model Explains Irrational Behavior in Human Decision-Making

Although praised for their rationality, humans often make poor decisions, even in simple situations. In the repeated binary choice experiment, an individual has to choose repeatedly between the same two alternatives, where a reward is assigned to one of them with fixed probability. The optimal strategy is to perseverate with choosing the alternative with the best expected return. Whereas many species perseverate, humans tend to match the frequencies of their choices to the frequencies of the alternatives, a sub-optimal strategy known as probability matching. Our goal was to find the primary cognitive constraints under which a set of simple evolutionary rules can lead to such contrasting behaviors. We simulated the evolution of artificial populations, wherein the fitness of each animat (artificial animal) depended on its ability to predict the next element of a sequence made up of a repeating binary string of varying size. When the string was short relative to the animats’ neural capacity, they could learn it and correctly predict the next element of the sequence. When it was long, they could not learn it, turning to the next best option: to perseverate. Animats from the last generation then performed the task of predicting the next element of a non-periodical binary sequence. We found that, whereas animats with smaller neural capacity kept perseverating with the best alternative as before, animats with larger neural capacity, which had previously been able to learn the pattern of repeating strings, adopted probability matching, being outperformed by the perseverating animats. Our results demonstrate how the ability to make predictions in an environment endowed with regular patterns may lead to probability matching under less structured conditions. They point to probability matching as a likely by-product of adaptive cognitive strategies that were crucial in human evolution, but may lead to sub-optimal performances in other environments

Collective Animal Behavior from Bayesian Estimation and Probability Matching

Animals living in groups make movement decisions that depend, among other factors, on social interactions with other group members. Our present understanding of social rules in animal collectives is based on empirical fits to observations and we lack first-principles approaches that allow their derivation. Here we show that patterns of collective decisions can be derived from the basic ability of animals to make probabilistic estimations in the presence of uncertainty. We build a decision-making model with two stages: Bayesian estimation and probabilistic matching.
In the first stage, each animal makes a Bayesian estimation of which behavior is best to perform taking into account personal information about the environment and social information collected by observing the behaviors of other animals. In the probability matching stage, each animal chooses a behavior with a probability given by the Bayesian estimation that this behavior is the most appropriate one. This model derives very simple rules of interaction in animal collectives that depend only on two types of reliability parameters, one that each animal assigns to the other animals and another given by the quality of the non-social information. We test our model by obtaining theoretically a rich set of observed collective patterns of decisions in three-spined sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus, a shoaling fish species. The quantitative link shown between probabilistic estimation and collective rules of behavior allows a better contact with other fields such as foraging, mate selection, neurobiology and psychology, and gives predictions for experiments directly testing the relationship between estimation and collective behavior

Grouping by feature of cross-modal flankers in temporal ventriloquism

Signals in one sensory modality can influence perception of another, for example the bias of visual timing by audition: temporal ventriloquism. Strong accounts of temporal ventriloquism hold that the sensory representation of visual signal timing changes to that of the nearby sound. Alternatively, underlying sensory representations do not change. Rather, perceptual grouping processes based on spatial, temporal, and featural information produce best-estimates of global event properties. In support of this interpretation, when feature-based perceptual grouping conflicts with temporal information-based in scenarios that reveal temporal ventriloquism, the effect is abolished. However, previous demonstrations of this disruption used long-range visual apparent-motion stimuli. We investigated whether similar manipulations of feature grouping could also disrupt the classical temporal ventriloquism demonstration, which occurs over a short temporal range. We estimated the precision of participants’ reports of which of two visual bars occurred first. The bars were accompanied by different cross-modal signals that onset synchronously or asynchronously with each bar. Participants’ performance improved with asynchronous presentation relative to synchronous - temporal ventriloquism - however, unlike the long-range apparent motion paradigm, this was unaffected by different combinations of cross-modal feature, suggesting that featural similarity of cross-modal signals may not modulate cross-modal temporal influences in short time scales

No rapid audiovisual recalibration in adults on the autism spectrum

Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by difficulties in social cognition, but are also associated with atypicalities in sensory and perceptual processing. Several groups have reported that autistic individuals show reduced integration of socially relevant audiovisual signals, which may contribute to the higher-order social and cognitive difficulties observed in autism. Here we use a newly devised technique to study instantaneous adaptation to audiovisual asynchrony in autism. Autistic and typical participants were presented with sequences of brief visual and auditory stimuli, varying in asynchrony over a wide range, from 512 ms auditory-lead to 512 ms auditory-lag, and judged whether they seemed to be synchronous. Typical adults showed strong adaptation effects, with trials proceeded by an auditory-lead needing more auditory-lead to seem simultaneous, and vice versa. However, autistic observers showed little or no adaptation, although their simultaneity curves were as narrow as the typical adults. This result supports recent Bayesian models that predict reduced adaptation effects in autism. As rapid audiovisual recalibration may be fundamental for the optimisation of speech comprehension, recalibration problems could render language processing more difficult in autistic individuals, hindering social communication

Bayesian Cue Integration as a Developmental Outcome of Reward Mediated Learning

Average human behavior in cue combination tasks is well predicted by Bayesian inference models. As this capability is acquired over developmental timescales, the question arises, how it is learned. Here we investigated whether reward dependent learning, that is well established at the computational, behavioral, and neuronal levels, could contribute to this development. It is shown that a model free reinforcement learning algorithm can indeed learn to do cue integration, i.e. weight uncertain cues according to their respective reliabilities and even do so if reliabilities are changing. We also consider the case of causal inference where multimodal signals can originate from one or multiple separate objects and should not always be integrated. In this case, the learner is shown to develop a behavior that is closest to Bayesian model averaging. We conclude that reward mediated learning could be a driving force for the development of cue integration and causal inference

A Comprehensive Model of Audiovisual Perception: Both Percept and Temporal Dynamics

The sparse information captured by the sensory systems is used by the brain to apprehend the environment, for example, to spatially locate the source of audiovisual stimuli. This is an ill-posed inverse problem whose inherent uncertainty can be solved by jointly processing the information, as well as introducing constraints during this process, on the way this multisensory information is handled. This process and its result - the percept - depend on the contextual conditions perception takes place in. To date, perception has been investigated and modeled on the basis of either one of two of its dimensions: the percept or the temporal dynamics of the process. Here, we extend our previously proposed audiovisual perception model to predict both these dimensions to capture the phenomenon as a whole. Starting from a behavioral analysis, we use a data-driven approach to elicit a Bayesian network which infers the different percepts and dynamics of the process. Context-specific independence analyses enable us to use the model's structure to directly explore how different contexts affect the way subjects handle the same available information. Hence, we establish that, while the percepts yielded by a unisensory stimulus or by the non-fusion of multisensory stimuli may be similar, they result from different processes, as shown by their differing temporal dynamics. Moreover, our model predicts the impact of bottom-up (stimulus driven) factors as well as of top-down factors (induced by instruction manipulation) on both the perception process and the percept itself

Exposure to delayed visual feedback of the hand changes motor-sensory synchrony perception

We examined whether the brain can adapt to temporal delays between a self-initiated action and the naturalistic visual feedback of that action. During an exposure phase, participants tapped with their index finger while seeing their own hand in real time (~0 ms delay) or delayed at 40, 80, or 120 ms. Following exposure, participants were tested with a simultaneity judgment (SJ) task in which they judged whether the video of their hand was synchronous or asynchronous with respect to their finger taps. The locations of the seen and the real hand were either different (Experiment 1) or aligned (Experiment 2). In both cases, the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) was uniformly shifted in the direction of the exposure lags while sensitivity to visual-motor asynchrony decreased with longer exposure delays. These findings demonstrate that the brain is quite flexible in adjusting the timing relation between a motor action and the otherwise naturalistic visual feedback that this action engenders